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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plainbif f-Respmulent, 
-vs-
KENNETH TRUSTY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
12469 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Kenneth Trusty, appeals from the 
finding of guilty of the crime of murder in the second 
degree and from the sentence imposed upon him in 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah on the 26th day of January, 1971. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On December 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19, 1970, the 
appellant, Kenneth Trusty, was tried by a jury and 
was found guilty of the offense of murder in the second 
degree, an included offense to the offense charged. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant, seeks a reversal of his conviction ! 
for the crime of murder in the second degree and an 
order remanding the case back to the Third District 
Court for a new trial with orders from this court. 
STATE_MENT OF FACTS 
Early in the morning of April 12, 1970, Craig 1 
Crandall, the neighbor of the appellant and appellant's i 
wife, was shot in the head with a .22 caliber pistol and 
subsequently died. The appellant admitted to holding 
the pistol when it discharged (R. 274) but also indicated 
that the killing occurred in somewhat passionate cir-
cumstances. The appellant testified that immediately 
prior to the shooting, the appellant had argued with his 
wife. The appellant had suspected his wife of infidelity 
with the victim and confronted her with the accusation. 
The appellant's wife initially denied the affair but t?e 1 
appellant persisted and after some physical abuse, ap- 1 
pellant's wife admitted to having had intercourse with 
the victim upon three occasions. ( R. ~70-271). There-
1 
upon, the appellant ordered his wife to dress to go see 
what the victim had to say about the affair. The appel-
lant grabbed a pistol out of his closet and with his wife 
went to the victim's house. (R. 271) Opon waking the 
victim, the appellant and his wife went into the victim's 
house and the appellant showed a pistol to the victim. 
The appellant then accused the victim of having had in-
8 
tercourse with his wife. The victim denied the accusa-
tion hut eventually stated that he had "screwed her 100 
times." ( R. 273-27 4). The pistol discharged and the 
bullet struck the victim in the head. 
At the trial and before the appellant was sworn 
to testify and outside the hearing of the jury, the appel-
lant affirmatively invoked the husband-wife privilege 
in anticipation of the comment thereon by the prose-
cutor: 
"l\Ir. Athay: \Ve elect at this time to invoke the 
husband-wife privilege. We submit that any 
comment by the District Attorney with re-
spect to the election to invoke that privilege or 
the failure of the wife to testify in this matter 
is a violation of the law of the State of Utah, 
the United States' Constitution, and the State 
statute, and I think that's very well set forth 
in the Utah case of State v. Brown, 14 Utah 
2d 324, and I would like that to be shown in 
the record at this time." (R. 249-250) 
The appellant testified on direct examination. Dur-
ing the cross examination of the appellant the follow-
ing discourse took place: 
"'Q [By Mr. Banks]: You said everything 
that you said is the truth, is that right? 
'A: Right. 
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'Q: And I assume then, your wife will 
testify to the same thing, is that right? 
'A: I hope she testifies to the truth, that 
she doped me and she was having an affair 
with him. 
'Q: So I take it then ... 
'l\Ir. Athay: Your IIonor, I think we 
should approach the bench. 
'The Court: You may do so.' " (R. 349-
350) 
1Vhereupon the jury left the courtroom. 
Argument on the prosecutor's comment of appel-
lant's invocation of the husband and wife privilege was 
had. The appellant moved the court "for a mistrial on , 
the grounds and for the reasons that the comments and ! 
questions made by .Mr. Banks with respect to the [ap· 
pellant] and his wife and the deceased being the only 
persons who could know and testify concerning this 
mat~er ... " (U. 357) That mo_tion was t~ken under I 
advisement by the court at that hme. (It. 3o9) · 
vVhen the jury returned to the courtroom, the 
judge said, "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, any 
questions in regard to whether or not Mrs. Trusty will 1 
testify are to be totally disregarded by you. It is com· 
pletely irrelevant in this case, and you're not to con· 
sider that point at all." (R. 359) 
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After the jury was charged with the case, the 
judge denied appellant's motion for a mistrial. (R. 507) 
The jury returned with a verdict finding the appellant 
guilty of murder in the second degree. (R. 512) The 
appellant was sentenced to a term of from ten ( 10) 
years to life in the Utah State Prison on January 26, 
1971. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
GRANTING APPELLANT'S l\lOTION FOR 
A l\USTRIAL l\IADE UPON THE GROUNDS 
THAT THE APPELLANT'S INVOCATION 
OF THE HUSBAND-V\TIFE PRIVILEGE 
WAS COl\IMENTED ON IN VIOLATION Ol"' 
'l'HE LAvV. 
At the trial, and out of the hearing of the jury, 
the appellant affirmatively invoked the husband-wife 
privilege and refused to permit the appellant's wife to 
testify. Subsequently, both the prosecutor and the 
judge made comment upon that election. The appellant 
submits that those comments effectively destroyed the 
rights of the appellant to invoke the privilege imparted 
him by law and thus, the appellant's right to a fair and 
impartial trial was prejudiced. 
It is clear that the husband-wife privilege exists 
in Utah. The source of the privilege, however, is both 
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constitutional and statutory. Article 1, Section 12 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah provides that, 
"a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife ... " Seftion 
77-44-4, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953), states that, 
"Neither husband nor wife shall be a competent wit· 
ness for or against the other in a criminal action or pro-
ceeding to which one or both are parties, without the 
consent of the other, except ... [for certain circum-
stances not relevant here.]" Finally, Section 78-24-
8 ( l), Utah Code Annotated ( 1953), provides, in part, 
that, "a husband cannot be examined for or against the 
wife without her consent, nor a wife for or against her 
husband without consent; nor can either during the mar-
riage nor afterwards be, without the consent of the 
other, examined as to any communication made by one 
to the other during the marriage ... " 
It is clear that the Utah Constitution gives to :i 
wife the privilege not to testify against her husband 
and the statutes, Section 78-24-8 ( l), Utah Code Anno· 
tated, (1953) in particular, give the husband a privilege 
not to have his wife testify, irrespective of whether that 
testimony would be for him or against him. It is sub· 
mitte<l that taken together, these prvileges permit the 
testimony of a defendant's wife only with the consent 
of both the defendant and his wife. If the wife refuses 
to testify or the defendant refuses to permit his wife 
to testify, then the wife cannot testify. 
This court has construed the above statutory and 
constitutional provisions to impart that exact effect. 
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As this court said, "Clearly, our constitution and 
statutes give both the husband and the wife a privilege 
that the wife shall not testify under the circumstances 
without the consent of both the husband and wife. 
State v. Brown, 14 Utah 2d 324 at 327, 328, 383 P. 2d 
930 ( 1963). 
Although such a privilege may be waived, it is 
submitted that waiver is not in issue because the appel-
lant affirmatively invoked the protection of the priv-
ilege to the court and the prosecutor out of the presence 
of the jury, (R. 24~}) and made a timely objection to 
the prosecutor's questions when it became apparent that 
the prosecutor was attempting to get the defendant to 
invoke the privilege to the jury. (R. 349) 
It is submitted that this case at hand is almost 
identical to the case of State v. Brown, supra. In that 
case the appellant was prosecuted for raping a sixteen 
year old girl. The appellant's defense was that of alibi 
in that he claimed that he was home with his wife at 
the time the offense was committed. The wife of the 
appellant was not called to testify because the wife 
would have been excluded from the trial under the ex-
clusionary rule. As l\1r. Hansen, the attornev for the . . 
clef endant in the Brown, supra, case, stated as Amicus 
Curiae at the trial, "Because of the exclusionary rule 
involved, we elected in his defense to have her near his 
side in support of him and remain in the courtroom and 
therefore we did not call her as a witness to corroborate 
his testimony that he was in fact at the home, that which 
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he had established as the alibi. That was the reason that 
she was not called." (R. 354) 
At the time of the closing argument, the prose-
cutor stated in his summation that the appellant's wife 
"is the one person who could have said defendant was 
at home" when the attack occurred and "did not testify." 
14 Utah 2d at 326. In reversing the conviction and re-
manding for a new trial, this court said, 
"The district attorney's comment to the 
jury in substance that the defendant's wife, 
the one person who could have testified that 
the defendant was home at the time that the 
assault occurred, did not testify was prejudi-
cial error. The defendant objected to the com-
ment on the ground that the \vif e has the 
privilege not to testify against her husband. 
The defendant claimed an alibi to the effect 
that at the time the State claimed he was as-
saulting Anita at her home in Farmington, he 
was with his wife in their home in Salt Lake 
City. But his wife who he claims was present 
with him at their home did not testify. 
"Clearly our constitution and statutes 
give both the husband and the wife the priv-
ilege that the wife shall not testify under these 
circumstances without the consent of both the 
husband and the wife. The cases are in hope-
less confusion on whether under somewhat 
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similar circumstances and statutes such com-
ment on the failure to testify is prejudicial 
error. l f such comment is permissible the priv-
ilege is largely destroyed. \1V e conclude that 
this comment destroyed the privilege not to 
testify and was prejudicial." 14 Utah 2d at 
327, 328. 
It is submitted that the Brown case stands for the 
proposition that when comment is made upon the 
privilege, the privilege is destroyed, thus prejudicing 
the defendaut and therefore Brown requires that the 
case be remanded for a new trial. 
The only question which may be at issue because 
it is not directly covered by the Brown case is that of the 
actual comment upon the privilege. In the Brown case, 
the prosecutor commented to the jury in his closing 
argument. In the instant case, the prosecutor comment-
ed upon the privilege during his cross examination of 
the appellant. He said, "And I assume then that your 
wife will testify to the same thing, is that right?" ( R. 
349) At that point the defendant objected and after 
argument, made a timely motion for a mistrial (R. 349) 
which was later denied. (R. 507) 
It is submitted that by asking that question the 
district attorney entered an area forbidden by Brown. 
By asking the appellant whether or not his wife would 
testify, the prosecutor effectively destroyed the priv-
ilege which the Bro~·n case indicates is prejudicial error. 
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It is submitted that if any of the jurors had not 
been made aware that the appellant had invoked the 
privilege by the questions of the prosecutor, the court 
made sure that those jurors in fact knew. The court 
admonished the jurors that, "any questions in regard to 
whether or not .l\Irs. Trusty will testify are to be total-
ly disregarded by you. It is completely irrelevant in 
this case, and you're not to consider that point at all." 
( R. 3/59) This admonishment could not have corrected 
the error committed by the prosecutor's question any 
more than such an admonishment could erase the com-
ment of the prosecutor in the closing argument as in 
the Brown case. It is submitted that the admonishing 
comment of the court only served to engrain the fact 
that the appellant had invoked the privilege and, by 
itself, effectively destroyed the privilege and commit-
ted the prejudicial error discussed in Brown. 
Further, if neither the question of the prosecutor 
nor the admonishment of the court is sufficient by it-
self to destroy the privilege, it is submitted that taken 
together, the comments did prejudice the appellant and 
create reversible error. 
It is submitted that the privilege was commented 
on by the prosecutor or by the court or by both, and 
was thusly destroyed. The Brown case, supra, holds 
that the destruction of the privilege is prejudicial error. 
It is therefore submitted that this court must reverse 
the conviction of appellant and remand this case to the 
district court for a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that because the trial 
court erred in denying appellant's motion for mistrial 
which was made upon the grounds that the appeJlant's 
invocation of the husband-wife privilege was improper-
ly brought to the attention of the jury, thus prejudicing 
the appellant, the judgment below should be reversed 
and the case should be remanded back for a new trial 
with instructions from this court. 
Respectfully submitted 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
Attorney for Appellant 
